Prophet Secretary Through Blind Strategies
Jose Correa, Raimundo Saona, Bruno Ziliotto

TL;DR
This paper introduces blind quantile strategies for the Prophet Secretary problem, achieving a competitive ratio of 0.665, which improves previous bounds, and establishes theoretical limits for such strategies and any algorithm.
Contribution
It proposes a new class of strategies called blind quantile strategies that improve the known competitive ratio for the Prophet Secretary problem.
Findings
Blind strategies achieve a ratio of 0.665.
Upper bound for blind strategies is 0.675.
Any algorithm cannot surpass a ratio of 0.732.
Abstract
In the classic prophet inequality, samples from independent random variables arrive online. A gambler that knows the distributions must decide at each point in time whether to stop and pick the current sample or to continue and lose that sample forever. The goal of the gambler is to maximize the expected value of what she picks and the performance measure is the worst case ratio between the expected value the gambler gets and what a prophet, that sees all the realizations in advance, gets. In the late seventies, Krengel and Sucheston, and Gairing (1977) established that this worst case ratio is a universal constant equal to 1/2. In the last decade prophet inequalities has resurged as an important problem due to its connections to posted price mechanisms, frequently used in online sales. A very interesting variant is the Prophet Secretary problem, in which the only difference is that the…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Advanced Bandit Algorithms Research
