Multi-Stage Complex Contagions in Random Multiplex Networks
Yong Zhuang, Osman Ya\u{g}an

TL;DR
This paper analyzes multi-stage complex contagions over multiplex networks using a linear threshold model, providing analytical and numerical insights into how network structure and hyper-active nodes influence cascade dynamics.
Contribution
It introduces a multi-stage contagion model on multiplex networks, deriving analytical results for cascade probability and size, and explores the effects of network structure and hyper-active nodes.
Findings
Hyper-active nodes significantly influence cascade size.
Network assortativity affects the impact of hyper-active nodes.
Analytical results are validated by extensive numerical simulations.
Abstract
Complex contagion models have been developed to understand a wide range of social phenomena such as adoption of cultural fads, the diffusion of belief, norms, and innovations in social networks, and the rise of collective action to join a riot. Most existing works focus on contagions where individuals' states are represented by {\em binary} variables, and propagation takes place over a single isolated network. However, characterization of an individual's standing on a given matter as a binary state might be overly simplistic as most of our opinions, feelings, and perceptions vary over more than two states. Also, most real-world contagions take place over multiple networks (e.g., Twitter and Facebook) or involve {\em multiplex} networks where individuals engage in different {\em types} of relationships (e.g., acquaintance, co-worker, family, etc.). To this end, this paper studies {\em…
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Taxonomy
TopicsComplex Network Analysis Techniques · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
