Self-consistency of voting implies majority vote

TL;DR

This paper provides an axiomatic characterization of majority vote rules based on voting consistency, offering an alternative to May's 1952 approach and discussing its relation to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem.

Contribution

It introduces a new axiomatic framework centered on voting consistency to characterize majority vote rules, contrasting with previous characterizations.

Findings

Develops a new axiomatic characterization of majority voting

Highlights differences between consistency-based and May's axioms

Discusses implications for Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

Abstract

Paper develops axiomatic characterization of the family of majority vote rules in the way alternative to characterization of the majority vote given in paper of Kenneth O. May in the 1952. This, similar but different, axiomatics focuses on the consistency of the voting procedure. Both approaches are compared. Relation to famous Kenneth J. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is also discussed.