Complexity Results for Preference Aggregation over (m)CP-nets: Pareto and Majority Voting
Thomas Lukasiewicz, Enrico Malizia

TL;DR
This paper provides a detailed complexity analysis of global voting methods over (m)CP-nets, revealing new bounds and filling gaps in understanding preference aggregation without the $ ext{O}$-legality restriction.
Contribution
It offers the first comprehensive complexity classification of Pareto and majority global voting over non-$ ext{O}$-legal (m)CP-nets, including tight bounds and polynomial hierarchy results.
Findings
Many problems are in the polynomial hierarchy.
Some problems are in PTIME or LOGSPACE.
Previously, most were only known to be in EXPTIME.
Abstract
Combinatorial preference aggregation has many applications in AI. Given the exponential nature of these preferences, compact representations are needed and ()CP-nets are among the most studied ones. Sequential and global voting are two ways to aggregate preferences over CP-nets. In the former, preferences are aggregated feature-by-feature. Hence, when preferences have specific feature dependencies, sequential voting may exhibit voting paradoxes, i.e., it might select sub-optimal outcomes. To avoid paradoxes in sequential voting, one has often assumed the -legality restriction, which imposes a shared topological order among all the CP-nets. On the contrary, in global voting, CP-nets are considered as a whole during preference aggregation. For this reason, global voting is immune from paradoxes, and there is no need to impose restrictions over the CP-nets' topological…
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