Impact of End-User Behavior on User/Network Association in HetNets

TL;DR

This paper investigates how end-user perceptions, modeled by Prospect Theory, influence user and network association strategies in HetNets, revealing that underestimation of service guarantees affects equilibrium outcomes and user utilities.

Contribution

It introduces a novel game-theoretic framework incorporating Prospect Theory to analyze user behavior in HetNets, highlighting the impact on equilibrium strategies and proposing mitigation mechanisms.

Findings

Underestimation of service guarantees alters Nash Equilibria feasibility.

User utilities decrease when users underestimate service guarantees.

Proposed mechanisms help mitigate negative effects of behavioral biases.

Abstract

We study the impact of end-user behavior on user/network association in a HetNet with multiple service providers (SPs). Specifically, we consider the uncertainty in the service guarantees offered by SPs in a HetNet, and use Prospect Theory (PT) to model end-user decision making. We formulate user association with SPs as a multiple leader Stackelberg game where each SP offers a data rate to each user with a certain service guarantee and at a certain price, while the user chooses the best offer among multiple such bids. Using the specific example of a HetNet with one cellular base station and one WiFi access point, we show that when the end users underestimate the advertised service guarantees, then some of the Nash Equilibrium strategies under the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) model become infeasible under PT, and for those Nash Equilibria that are feasible under both EUT and PT, the resulting user utilities are less under PT. We propose resource allocation and bidding mechanisms for the SPs to mitigate these effects.