TL;DR
This paper introduces PURBs, a new encrypted data format that minimizes metadata leakage by producing ciphertexts indistinguishable from random data, enhancing privacy and security.
Contribution
The paper presents PURBs, a cryptographically secure, padding-efficient encrypted format that prevents metadata leakage even from the format's own creation process.
Findings
PURBs produce ciphertexts indistinguishable from random data.
The Padmé padding scheme minimizes information leakage to O(log log M) bits.
Efficient decryption is possible for multiple recipients with diverse cryptographic suites.
Abstract
Most encrypted data formats leak metadata via their plaintext headers, such as format version, encryption schemes used, number of recipients who can decrypt the data, and even the recipients' identities. This leakage can pose security and privacy risks to users, e.g., by revealing the full membership of a group of collaborators from a single encrypted e-mail, or by enabling an eavesdropper to fingerprint the precise encryption software version and configuration the sender used. We propose that future encrypted data formats improve security and privacy hygiene by producing or PURBs: ciphertexts indistinguishable from random bit strings to anyone without a decryption key. A PURB's content leaks , even the application that created it, and is padded such that even its length leaks as little as possible. Encoding and decoding…
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