Preserving the Location Privacy of Secondary Users in Cooperative Spectrum Sensing

TL;DR

This paper introduces cryptographic protocols to protect the location privacy of secondary users in cooperative spectrum sensing, balancing security, efficiency, and architectural costs.

Contribution

It proposes novel privacy-preserving schemes utilizing cryptography, offering flexible tradeoffs and robustness against malicious entities and network changes.

Findings

Schemes are secure and more efficient than existing methods.

Protocols achieve fault tolerance and robustness.

Tradeoffs between cryptographic complexity and architectural costs.

Abstract

Cooperative spectrum sensing, despite its effectiveness in enabling dynamic spectrum access, suffers from location privacy threats, merely because secondary users (SUs)' sensing reports that need to be shared with a fusion center to make spectrum availability decisions are highly correlated to the users' locations. It is therefore important that cooperative spectrum sensing schemes be empowered with privacy preserving capabilities so as to provide SUs with incentives for participating in the sensing task. In this paper, we propose privacy preserving protocols that make use of various cryptographic mechanisms to preserve the location privacy of SUs while performing reliable and efficient spectrum sensing. We also present cost-performance tradeoffs. The first consists on using an additional architectural entity at the benefit of incurring lower computation overhead by relying only on symmetric cryptography. The second consists on using an additional secure comparison protocol at the benefit of incurring lesser architectural cost by not requiring extra entities. Our schemes can also adapt to the case of a malicious fusion center as we discuss in this paper. We also show that not only are our proposed schemes secure and more efficient than existing alternatives, but also achieve fault tolerance and are robust against sporadic network topological changes.