Nethammer: Inducing Rowhammer Faults through Network Requests
Moritz Lipp, Misiker Tadesse Aga, Michael Schwarz, Daniel, Gruss, Cl\'ementine Maurice, Lukas Raab, Lukas Lamster

TL;DR
Nethammer demonstrates a novel remote Rowhammer attack that exploits network request handling to induce memory bit flips without local code execution, threatening various systems including PCs, servers, and mobile devices.
Contribution
This work introduces Nethammer, the first remote Rowhammer attack method that does not require attacker-controlled code on the target system.
Findings
Remote attack feasible via network request handling
Cache misses frequency sufficient to induce bit flips
Effective across PCs, servers, and mobile phones
Abstract
A fundamental assumption in software security is that memory contents do not change unless there is a legitimate deliberate modification. Classical fault attacks show that this assumption does not hold if the attacker has physical access. Rowhammer attacks showed that local code execution is already sufficient to break this assumption. Rowhammer exploits parasitic effects in DRAM to modify the content of a memory cell without accessing it. Instead, other memory locations are accessed at a high frequency. All Rowhammer attacks so far were local attacks, running either in a scripted language or native code. In this paper, we present Nethammer. Nethammer is the first truly remote Rowhammer attack, without a single attacker-controlled line of code on the targeted system. Systems that use uncached memory or flush instructions while handling network requests, e.g., for interaction with the…
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