A liability allocation game

TL;DR

This paper analyzes a novel two-player game involving strategic allocation of counters across boxes, examining probabilistic dynamics and outcomes, and providing analytical and numerical insights into its behavior.

Contribution

It introduces and studies a new game model with probabilistic box selection, offering the first analytical and numerical analysis of its strategic properties.

Findings

Derived formulas for winning probabilities.

Identified optimal strategies under various conditions.

Presented numerical simulations illustrating game dynamics.

Abstract

The following problem is considered. Two players are each required to allocate a quota of~$n$ counters among~$k$ boxes labelled~$1,2,\ldots,k$. At times $t=1,2,3,\ldots$ a random box is identified; the probability of choosing box~$i$ is~$p_i$. If a player has at least one counter in the chosen box, she removes one counter from it; otherwise she takes no action. The winner is the first player to remove all her counters. The game so described may be modified so that each player simultaneously, but independently, identifies a box at random. This paper analyses this deceptively simple game, which has apparently not been studied in the literature. Some analytical and numerical results are then presented, followed by some challenges for further work.