Eat & Tell: A Randomized Trial of Random-Loss Incentive to Increase Dietary Self-Tracking Compliance
Palakorn Achananuparp, Ee-Peng Lim, Vibhanshu Abhishek, Tianjiao Yun

TL;DR
This study introduces a novel random-loss incentive based on behavioral economics principles to improve long-term dietary self-tracking compliance, demonstrating its effectiveness over fixed-loss incentives in a randomized trial.
Contribution
The paper presents a new random-loss incentive design and empirically tests its effectiveness in enhancing long-term dietary self-tracking compliance.
Findings
Random losses outperform fixed losses in promoting engagement.
Random-loss incentives significantly increase long-term compliance.
The approach leverages loss aversion and unpredictability principles.
Abstract
A growing body of evidence has shown that incorporating behavioral economics principles into the design of financial incentive programs helps improve their cost-effectiveness, promote individuals' short-term engagement, and increase compliance in health behavior interventions. Yet, their effects on long-term engagement have not been fully examined. In study designs where repeated administration of incentives is required to ensure the regularity of behaviors, the effectiveness of subsequent incentives may decrease as a result of the law of diminishing marginal utility. In this paper, we introduce random-loss incentive -- a new financial incentive based on loss aversion and unpredictability principles -- to address the problem of individuals' growing insensitivity to repeated interventions over time. We evaluate the new incentive design by conducting a randomized controlled trial to…
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