How to end password reuse on the web
Ke Coby Wang, Michael K. Reiter

TL;DR
This paper proposes a privacy-preserving framework enabling websites to detect and discourage password reuse among users, aiming to improve web security without compromising user privacy.
Contribution
It introduces a novel private set-membership-test protocol for cross-site password reuse detection, with techniques to mitigate privacy risks and ensure scalability.
Findings
The protocol effectively detects password reuse without revealing passwords.
Privacy mitigation techniques maintain security while enabling cross-site checks.
Implementation demonstrates scalability and user experience compatibility.
Abstract
We present a framework by which websites can coordinate to make it difficult for users to set similar passwords at these websites, in an effort to break the culture of password reuse on the web today. Though the design of such a framework is fraught with risks to users' security and privacy, we show that these risks can be effectively mitigated through careful scoping of the goals for such a framework and through principled design. At the core of our framework is a private set-membership-test protocol that enables one website to determine, upon a user setting a password for use at it, whether that user has already set a similar password at another participating website, but with neither side disclosing to the other the password(s) it employs in the protocol. Our framework then layers over this protocol a collection of techniques to mitigate the leakage necessitated by such a test. We…
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