A Reputation Scheme to Discourage Selfish QoS Manipulation in Two-Hop Wireless Relay Networks
Jerzy Konorski, Szymon Szott

TL;DR
This paper proposes RISC2WIN, a reputation-based scheme using game theory to prevent selfish QoS manipulation in two-hop wireless relay networks, ensuring fair resource allocation.
Contribution
It introduces RISC2WIN, a novel reputation scheme that discourages selfish QoS manipulation in relay networks through a trusted third party and game-theoretic modeling.
Findings
RISC2WIN effectively limits selfish QoS behavior.
The scheme maintains fair QoS levels for all stations.
Simulation results demonstrate improved network cooperation.
Abstract
In wireless networks, stations can improve their received quality of service (QoS) by handling packets of source flows with higher priority. Additionally, in cooperative relay networks, the relays can handle transit flows with lower priority. We use game theory to model a two-hop relay network where each of the two involved stations can commit such selfish QoS manipulation. We design and evaluate a reputation-based incentive scheme called RISC2WIN, whereby a trusted third party (e.g., an access point) can limit selfish behavior and preserve appropriate QoS for both stations.
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