From the master equation to mean field game limit theory: Large deviations and concentration of measure
Francois Delarue, Daniel Lacker, Kavita Ramanan

TL;DR
This paper investigates the convergence, concentration, and large deviations of Nash equilibria in large symmetric stochastic differential games, using the master equation and mean field game theory, with and without common noise.
Contribution
It introduces new concentration bounds and large deviation principles for mean field game limits, extending previous results to cases with common noise and specific examples.
Findings
Concentration bounds for Nash equilibrium empirical measures without common noise.
Weak and full large deviation principles established for systems with and without common noise.
Methodology adaptable to specific examples lacking initial assumptions.
Abstract
We study a sequence of symmetric -player stochastic differential games driven by both idiosyncratic and common sources of noise, in which players interact with each other through their empirical distribution. The unique Nash equilibrium empirical measure of the -player game is known to converge, as goes to infinity, to the unique equilibrium of an associated mean field game. Under suitable regularity conditions, in the absence of common noise, we complement this law of large numbers result with non-asymptotic concentration bounds for the Wasserstein distance between the -player Nash equilibrium empirical measure and the mean field equilibrium. We also show that the sequence of Nash equilibrium empirical measures satisfies a weak large deviation principle, which can be strengthened to a full large deviation principle only in the absence of common noise. For both sets of…
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Taxonomy
TopicsStatistical Mechanics and Entropy · Stochastic processes and financial applications · Markov Chains and Monte Carlo Methods
