A Structural and Algorithmic Study of Stable Matching Lattices of "Nearby" Instances, with Applications

TL;DR

This paper studies the structural relationships between stable matching lattices of instances that differ by arbitrary preference permutations, providing algorithms for intersection and partial order generation, with applications to robust matching and incentive analysis.

Contribution

It extends previous work by allowing arbitrary preference permutations, establishing lattice properties, and developing polynomial algorithms for stable matching intersections and partial order retrieval.

Findings

The intersection of stable matchings forms a sublattice.

An efficient algorithm is provided for finding common stable matchings.

Applications include robust stable matching and incentive compatibility analysis.

Abstract

Recently MV18 identified and initiated work on the new problem of understanding structural relationships between the lattices of solutions of two "nearby" instances of stable matching. They also gave an application of their work to finding a robust stable matching. However, the types of changes they allowed in going from instance $A$ to $B$ were very restricted, namely any one agent executes an upward shift. In this paper, we allow any one agent to permute its preference list arbitrarily. Let $M_A$ and $M_B$ be the sets of stable matchings of the resulting pair of instances $A$ and $B$, and let $\mathcal{L}_A$ and $\mathcal{L}_B$ be the corresponding lattices of stable matchings. We prove that the matchings in $M_A \cap M_B$ form a sublattice of both $\mathcal{L}_A$ and $\mathcal{L}_B$ and those in $M_A \setminus M_B$ form a join semi-sublattice of $\mathcal{L}_A$. These properties enable us to obtain a polynomial time algorithm for not only finding a stable matching in $M_A \cap M_B$, but also for obtaining the partial order, as promised by Birkhoff's Representation Theorem, thereby enabling us to generate all matchings in this sublattice. Our algorithm also helps solve a version of the robust stable matching problem. We discuss another potential application, namely obtaining new insights into the incentive compatibility properties of the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance Algorithm.