The rationality of irrationality in the Monty Hall problem
Torsten En{\ss}lin, Margret Westerkamp

TL;DR
This paper explores why people feel irrational about the Monty Hall problem by considering real-world factors like manipulative hosts, suggesting that staying with the initial choice can be a rational strategy in such contexts.
Contribution
It introduces a real-world perspective on the Monty Hall problem, proposing that intuitive preferences are rational responses to potential host manipulation.
Findings
Intuitive preferences align with rational strategies in manipulated game show scenarios.
Host manipulation can make switching less advantageous, explaining people's intuition.
The analysis connects psychological intuition with information-theoretic considerations.
Abstract
The rational solution of the Monty Hall problem unsettles many people. Most people, including the authors, think it feels wrong to switch the initial choice of one of the three doors, despite having fully accepted the mathematical proof for its superiority. Many people, if given the choice to switch, think the chances are fifty-fifty between their options, but still strongly prefer to stay with their initial choice. Is there some sense behind these irrational feelings? We entertain the possibility that intuition solves the problem of how to behave in a real game show, not in the abstract textbook version of the Monty Hall problem. A real showmaster sometimes plays evil, either to make the show more interesting, to save money, or because he is in a bad mood. A moody showmaster erases any information advantage the guest could extract by him opening other doors which drives the chance of…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
