Characterization of the Pareto social choice correspondence
Jerry S. Kelly
TL;DR
This paper establishes precise conditions under which a social choice correspondence uniquely identifies Pareto optimal alternatives, enhancing understanding of social choice mechanisms.
Contribution
It provides necessary and sufficient conditions characterizing when a social choice correspondence selects Pareto optimal outcomes.
Findings
Derived conditions for Pareto optimality in social choice
Characterized social choice correspondences with Pareto properties
Enhanced theoretical understanding of social choice mechanisms
Abstract
Necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for a social choice correspondence to be the one that selects the Pareto optimal alternatives.
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