PowerHammer: Exfiltrating Data from Air-Gapped Computers through Power Lines
Mordechai Guri, Boris Zadov, Dima Bykhovsky, Yuval Elovici

TL;DR
PowerHammer demonstrates a novel method of exfiltrating data from air-gapped computers by modulating power line fluctuations, achieving covert communication at significant bit rates through electrical outlets and panels.
Contribution
This paper introduces PowerHammer, a new malware technique that exploits power line emissions to covertly transmit data from air-gapped systems, including detailed attack models and countermeasures.
Findings
Data exfiltration at 1000 bits/sec via line level attack
Data exfiltration at 10 bits/sec via phase level attack
Effective countermeasures reduce covert channel effectiveness
Abstract
In this paper we provide an implementation, evaluation, and analysis of PowerHammer, a malware (bridgeware [1]) that uses power lines to exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers. In this case, a malicious code running on a compromised computer can control the power consumption of the system by intentionally regulating the CPU utilization. Data is modulated, encoded, and transmitted on top of the current flow fluctuations, and then it is conducted and propagated through the power lines. This phenomena is known as a 'conducted emission'. We present two versions of the attack. Line level powerhammering: In this attack, the attacker taps the in-home power lines1 that are directly attached to the electrical outlet. Phase level power-hammering: In this attack, the attacker taps the power lines at the phase level, in the main electrical service panel. In both versions of the attack, the…
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