Prompt Scheduling for Selfish Agents
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Tzahi Taub
TL;DR
This paper introduces the first prompt online mechanism for scheduling jobs to minimize total weighted completion times, especially effective when jobs are strategic agents, featuring a simple anonymous menu of options.
Contribution
It presents a novel prompt online algorithm for scheduling that accounts for strategic agents, with a simple and anonymous mechanism design.
Findings
First prompt online algorithm for the problem
Effective in strategic agent scenarios
Mechanism has a simple anonymous menu
Abstract
We give a prompt online mechanism for minimizing the sum of [weighted] completion times. This is the first prompt online algorithm for the problem. When such jobs are strategic agents, delaying scheduling decisions makes little sense. Moreover, the mechanism has a particularly simple form of an anonymous menu of options.
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Taxonomy
TopicsOptimization and Search Problems · Auction Theory and Applications · Scheduling and Optimization Algorithms