The Schulze Method of Voting
Markus Schulze

TL;DR
The paper introduces the Schulze method for single-winner elections, proves its compliance with key criteria, and extends it to proportional representation and multi-winner elections, supported by numerous illustrative examples.
Contribution
It presents a new voting method satisfying many criteria and generalizes it for proportional and multi-winner elections, with comprehensive theoretical proofs and examples.
Findings
Schulze method satisfies key electoral criteria.
Generalization to proportional and multi-winner elections.
Method demonstrated with extensive examples.
Abstract
We propose a new single-winner election method ("Schulze method") and prove that it satisfies many academic criteria (e.g. monotonicity, reversal symmetry, resolvability, independence of clones, Condorcet criterion, k-consistency, polynomial runtime). We then generalize this method to proportional representation by the single transferable vote ("Schulze STV") and to methods to calculate a proportional ranking ("Schulze proportional ranking"). Furthermore, we propose a generalization of the Condorcet criterion to multi-winner elections. This paper contains a large number of examples to illustrate the proposed methods.
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Advanced Algebra and Logic · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
