A theory of consciousness: computation, algorithm, and neurobiological realization

TL;DR

This paper proposes a neurobiological theory of consciousness, suggesting that subjective sensation arises from the brain's internal estimation of fitness and its inversion via thalamocortical feedback, producing a distinct form of causation.

Contribution

It introduces a novel theory linking consciousness to internal fitness estimation and its inversion through specific brain feedback loops, explaining subjective sensation.

Findings

Thalamocortical feedback loop in switched mode inverts fitness estimates.

Inversion of estimates produces a distinct, localized causation associated with consciousness.

The theory explains subjective feeling as a special form of causation in the brain.

Abstract

The most enigmatic aspect of consciousness is the fact that it is felt, as a subjective sensation. The theory proposed here aims to explain this particular aspect. The theory encompasses both the computation that is presumably involved and the way in which that computation may be realized in the brain's neurobiology. It is assumed that the brain makes an internal estimate of an individual's own evolutionary fitness, which can be shown to produce a special, distinct form of causation. Communicating components of the fitness estimate (either for external or internal use) requires inverting them. Such inversion can be performed by the thalamocortical feedback loop in the mammalian brain, if that loop is operating in a switched, dual-stage mode. A first (nonconscious) stage produces forward estimates, whereas the second (conscious) stage inverts those estimates. It is argued that inversion produces another special, distinct form of causation, which is spatially localized and is plausibly sensed as the feeling of consciousness.