Path to Stochastic Stability: Comparative Analysis of Stochastic Learning Dynamics in Games
Hassan Jaleel, Jeff S. Shamma

TL;DR
This paper develops a framework to compare different stochastic learning dynamics in games, focusing on their paths to equilibrium and short- to medium-term behaviors, beyond their shared steady states.
Contribution
It introduces a novel comparative analysis framework for stochastic learning rules with identical steady states, exemplified through Log-Linear and Metropolis Learning dynamics.
Findings
Distinct paths to equilibrium for LLL and ML
Upper bounds on hitting times to Nash equilibria
Hierarchical state space decomposition into cycles
Abstract
Stochastic stability is a popular solution concept for stochastic learning dynamics in games. However, a critical limitation of this solution concept is its inability to distinguish between different learning rules that lead to the same steady-state behavior. We address this limitation for the first time and develop a framework for the comparative analysis of stochastic learning dynamics with different update rules but same steady-state behavior. We present the framework in the context of two learning dynamics: Log-Linear Learning (LLL) and Metropolis Learning (ML). Although both of these dynamics have the same stochastically stable states, LLL and ML correspond to different behavioral models for decision making. Moreover, we demonstrate through an example setup of sensor coverage game that for each of these dynamics, the paths to stochastically stable states exhibit distinctive…
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