Signaling Game-based Misbehavior Inspection in V2I-enabled Highway Operations

TL;DR

This paper models strategic misbehavior in V2I highway systems using a signaling game, analyzing how inspection costs and fines influence vehicle incentives and operator strategies to maintain system integrity.

Contribution

It introduces a signaling game framework to analyze vehicle misbehavior incentives and operator inspection strategies in V2I highway operations.

Findings

Equilibrium conditions depend on inspection and fine costs.

Operators can optimize inspection strategies based on vehicle incentives.

Misbehavior externalities impact overall highway efficiency.

Abstract

Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communications are increasingly supporting highway operations such as electronic toll collection, carpooling, and vehicle platooning. In this paper we study the incentives of strategic misbehavior by individual vehicles who can exploit the security vulnerabilities in V2I communications and negatively impact the highway operations. We consider a V2I-enabled highway segment facing two classes of vehicles (agent populations), each with an authorized access to one server (subset of lanes). Vehicles are strategic in that they can misreport their class (type) to the system operator and get an unauthorized access to the server dedicated to the other class. This misbehavior causes additional congestion externality on the compliant vehicles, and thus, needs to be deterred. We focus on an environment where the operator is able to inspect the vehicles for misbehavior. The inspection is costly and successful detection incurs a fine on the misbehaving vehicle. We formulate a signaling game to study the strategic interaction between the vehicle classes and the operator. Our equilibrium analysis provides conditions on the cost parameters that govern the vehicles' incentive to misbehave or not. We also determine the operator's equilibrium inspection strategy.