Secure Wireless Powered and Cooperative Jamming D2D Communications

TL;DR

This paper explores secure D2D communication powered by wireless energy transfer from a hybrid base station that also acts as a cooperative jammer, using game theory to optimize energy trading and security strategies.

Contribution

It introduces a novel Stackelberg game framework for energy trading and security in wireless-powered D2D networks with multiple eavesdroppers, including closed-form equilibrium solutions.

Findings

Energy trading improves security and efficiency.

Game-theoretic models outperform social welfare optimization.

Simulation validates the effectiveness of proposed schemes.

Abstract

This paper investigates a secure wireless-powered device-to-device (D2D) communication network in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers, where a hybrid base station (BS) in a cellular network not only provides power wirelessly for the D2D transmitter to guarantee power efficiency for the D2D network, but also serves as a cooperative jammer (CJ) to interfere with the eavesdroppers. The cellular and D2D networks can belong to different service providers, which means that the D2D transmitter would need to pay for the energy service released by the hybrid BS to guarantee secure D2D communication. In order to exploit the hierarchical interaction between the BS and the D2D transmitter, we first formulate a Stackelberg game based energy trading scheme, where the quadratic energy cost model is considered. Then, a non-energy trading based Stackelberg game is investigated to study the reversed roles of the BS and the D2D users. For comparison, we also formulate and resolve the social welfare optimization problem. We derive the closed-form Stackelberg equilibriums of the formulated games and the optimal solutions for the social welfare optimization problem. Simulation results are provided to validate our proposed schemes to highlight the importance of energy trading interaction between cellular and D2D networks.