Reputation is required for cooperation to emerge in dynamic networks
Jose A. Cuesta, Carlos Gracia-L\'azaro, Yamir Moreno, Angel S\'anchez

TL;DR
This paper argues that reputation, rather than mere interaction dynamics, is essential for cooperation to emerge in dynamic networks, challenging previous experimental claims.
Contribution
It critically analyzes prior experimental results, emphasizing the necessity of reputational knowledge for cooperation in dynamic networks.
Findings
Reputation is crucial for cooperation to develop.
Purely dynamic interactions without reputation do not sustain cooperation.
Previous experiments may have overlooked the role of reputation.
Abstract
Melamed, Harrell, and Simpson have recently reported on an experiment which appears to show that cooperation can arise in a dynamic network without reputational knowledge, i.e., purely via dynamics [1]. We believe that their experimental design is actually not testing this, in so far as players do know the last action of their current partners before making a choice on their own next action and subsequently deciding which link to cut. Had the authors given no information at all, the result would be a decline in cooperation as shown in [2].
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Taxonomy
TopicsEvolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Game Theory and Applications · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
