A Game-Theoretic Framework for the Virtual Machines Migration Timing Problem
Ahmed H. Anwar, George Atia, Mina Guirguis

TL;DR
This paper presents a game-theoretic model for determining optimal VM migration timing in cloud environments to mitigate side-channel attack risks, balancing costs for cloud providers and adversaries.
Contribution
It introduces a novel game-theoretic framework for VM migration timing, analyzing Nash equilibria and extending to intrusion detection impacts.
Findings
Existence of Nash equilibria under general cost functions.
Characterization of best responses for both cloud provider and attacker.
Numerical validation of theoretical results across various scenarios.
Abstract
In a multi-tenant cloud, a number of Virtual Machines (VMs) are collocated on the same physical machine to optimize performance, power consumption and maximize profit. This, however, increases the risk of a malicious VM performing side-channel attacks and leaking sensitive information from neighboring VMs. To this end, this paper develops and analyzes a game-theoretic framework for the VM migration timing problem in which the cloud provider decides \emph{when} to migrate a VM to a different physical machine to reduce the risk of being compromised by a collocated malicious VM. The adversary decides the rate at which she launches new VMs to collocate with the victim VMs. Our formulation captures a data leakage model in which the cost incurred by the cloud provider depends on the duration of collocation with malicious VMs. It also captures costs incurred by the adversary in launching new…
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