How Problematic is the Near-Euclidean Spatial Geometry of the Large-Scale Universe?

TL;DR

The paper critically examines the flatness problem in cosmology, arguing that the near-Euclidean geometry of the universe is not as problematic as traditionally thought and is comparable to other anthropic coincidences.

Contribution

It clarifies misconceptions about the flatness problem, distinguishes different issues in cosmology, and presents a phase space formulation to better understand the improbability of FLRW models.

Findings

The near-Euclidean geometry of the universe is not inherently puzzling.

The flatness problem is often based on questionable arguments and misconceptions.

A phase space approach reveals the improbability of standard cosmological models.

Abstract

Modern observations based on general relativity indicate that the spatial geometry of the expanding, large-scale Universe is very nearly Euclidean. This basic empirical fact is at the core of the so-called "flatness problem", which is widely perceived to be a major outstanding problem of modern cosmology and as such forms one of the prime motivations behind inflationary models. An inspection of the literature and some further critical reflection however quickly reveals that the typical formulation of this putative problem is fraught with questionable arguments and misconceptions and that it is moreover imperative to distinguish between different varieties of problem. It is shown that the observational fact that the large-scale Universe is so nearly flat is ultimately no more puzzling than similar "anthropic coincidences", such as the specific (orders of magnitude of the) values of the gravitational and electromagnetic coupling constants. In particular, there is no fine-tuning problem in connection to flatness of the kind usually argued for. The arguments regarding flatness and particle horizons typically found in cosmological discourses in fact address a mere $single$ issue underlying the standard FLRW cosmologies, namely the $extreme$ improbability of these models with respect to any "reasonable measure" on the "space of all spacetimes". This issue may be expressed in different ways and a phase space formulation, due to Penrose, is presented here. A horizon problem only arises when additional assumptions - which are usually kept implicit and at any rate seem rather speculative - are made.