On Multilateral Hierarchical Dynamic Decisions

TL;DR

This paper explores multilateral hierarchical dynamic decision problems by unifying various non-cooperative stopping game models with elements of cooperation, focusing on optimal stopping of random vectors in strategic settings.

Contribution

It provides a unified framework for non-cooperative stopping games incorporating cooperation, extending existing models with new strategic and informational considerations.

Findings

Unified approach to multilateral stopping games

Extension of models to include cooperation and strategic aims

Framework applicable to economics, IT, and industry decision problems

Abstract

Many decision problems in economics, information technology, and industry can be transformed to an optimal stopping of adapted random vectors with some utility function over the set of Markov times with respect to filtration build by the decision maker's knowledge. The optimal stopping problem formulation is to find a stopping time which maximizes the expected value of the accepted (stopped) random vector's utility. There are natural extensions of optimal stopping problem to stopping the games-the problem of stopping random vectors by two or more decision makers. Various approaches dependent on the information scheme and the aims of the agents in a considered model. This report unifies a group of non-cooperative stopping game models with forced cooperation by the role of the agents, their aims and aspirations (v. Assaf & Samuel-Cahn(1998), Szajowski & Yasuda(1995)) or extensions of the strategy sets (v. Ramsey & Szajowski(2008)).