TL;DR
This paper models the strategic interaction between DSRC and WiFi networks as a game, analyzing equilibrium strategies to optimize their respective performance metrics: age of information and throughput.
Contribution
It introduces a game-theoretic framework for coexistence of DSRC and WiFi, deriving equilibrium strategies for medium access probabilities.
Findings
Nash and Stackelberg equilibria are characterized.
Optimal strategies depend on network priorities and conditions.
Insights into coexistence trade-offs between latency and throughput.
Abstract
We model the coexistence of DSRC and WiFi networks as a strategic form game with the networks as the players. Nodes in a DSRC network must support messaging of status updates that are time sensitive. Such nodes would like to achieve a small age of information of status updates. In contrast, nodes in a WiFi network would like to achieve large throughputs. Each network chooses a medium access probability to be used by all its nodes. We investigate Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium strategies.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Code & Models
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
