Technical Report for "Incentivizing Wi-Fi Network Crowdsourcing: A Contract Theoretic Approach"
Qian Ma, Lin Gao, Ya-Feng Liu, Jianwei Huang

TL;DR
This paper develops a contract-based incentive framework for Wi-Fi crowdsourcing networks, accounting for private user information and equilibrium user choices to maximize operator profit.
Contribution
It introduces a novel contract design considering interdependent user choices and private information, optimizing profit in Wi-Fi crowdsourcing networks.
Findings
Higher Wi-Fi quality users tend to choose higher access prices and fees.
Increasing average Wi-Fi quality boosts operator profit.
Operators may lower prices as Wi-Fi quality improves.
Abstract
Crowdsourced wireless community network enables individual users to share their private Wi-Fi access points (APs) with each other, hence can achieve a large Wi-Fi coverage with a small deployment cost via crowdsourcing. This paper presents a novel contract-based incentive framework to incentivize such a Wi-Fi network crowdsourcing under incomplete information (where each user has certain private information such as mobility pattern and Wi-Fi access quality). In the proposed framework, the network operator designs and offers a set of contract items to users, each consisting of a Wi-Fi access price (that a user can charge others for accessing his AP) and a subscription fee (that a user needs to pay the operator for joining the community). Different from the existing contracts in the literature, in our contract model each user's best choice depends not only on his private information but…
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Taxonomy
TopicsWireless Networks and Protocols · Cognitive Radio Networks and Spectrum Sensing · ICT Impact and Policies
