Limiting gaming opportunities on incentive-based demand response programs
Jos\'e Vuelvas, Fredy Ruiz, Giambattista Gruosso

TL;DR
This paper introduces a novel contract for incentive-based demand response programs that reduces gaming opportunities by using a probabilistic call mechanism, ensuring voluntary participation and truthful reporting without requiring full type disclosure.
Contribution
A new contract mechanism employing probability of call is proposed to limit gaming and promote truthful reporting in demand response programs, avoiding complex full type communication.
Findings
The proposed contract limits gaming opportunities effectively.
Mathematical proofs demonstrate incentive compatibility.
Numerical studies confirm practical advantages.
Abstract
Demand Response (DR) is a program designed to match supply and demand by modifying consumption profile. Some of these programs are based on economic incentives, in which, a user is paid to reduce his energy requirements according to an estimated baseline. Literature review and practice have shown that the counter-factual models of employing baselines are vulnerable for gaming. Classical solutions of mechanism design require that agents communicate their full types which result in greater difficulties for its practical implementation. In this paper, a novel contract is developed to induce individual rationality (voluntary participation) and asymptotic incentive-compatibility (truthfulness) through probability of call, where an agent does not require to report the marginal utility. In this approach, a consumer only announces the baseline and reduction capacity, given a payment scheme that…
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