Non-Malleable Codes for Small-Depth Circuits
Marshall Ball, Dana Dachman-Soled, Siyao Guo, Tal Malkin, Li-Yang Tan

TL;DR
This paper presents a new construction of non-malleable codes secure against small-depth circuit tampering, achieving exponential improvements in code length over previous methods and utilizing advanced derandomization techniques.
Contribution
The authors introduce an efficient non-malleable reduction from small-depth tampering to split-state tampering, incorporating derandomization techniques to improve code length and efficiency.
Findings
Achieved exponential improvement in code length for small-depth circuit tampering
Extended the construction to circuits up to logarithmic depth with efficient code length
Utilized a pseudorandom switching lemma from circuit complexity in the analysis.
Abstract
We construct efficient, unconditional non-malleable codes that are secure against tampering functions computed by small-depth circuits. For constant-depth circuits of polynomial size (i.e. tampering functions), our codes have codeword length for a -bit message. This is an exponential improvement of the previous best construction due to Chattopadhyay and Li (STOC 2017), which had codeword length . Our construction remains efficient for circuit depths as large as (indeed, our codeword length remains , and extending our result beyond this would require separating from . We obtain our codes via a new efficient non-malleable reduction from small-depth tampering to split-state tampering. A novel aspect of our work is the incorporation of techniques from…
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Taxonomy
TopicsCryptography and Data Security · Complexity and Algorithms in Graphs · Cryptographic Implementations and Security
