Degressive representation of Member States in the European Parliament 2019-2024

TL;DR

This paper reviews four methods for allocating European Parliament seats based on degressive proportionality, highlighting the lack of a transparent, methodological approach in the 2018 allocation decision.

Contribution

It compares four allocation methods for degressive proportionality and discusses the opaque process behind the 2018 seat allocation decision.

Findings

Four allocation methods analyzed: Cambridge, Power, Modified Cambridge, 0.5-DPL.

2018 seat allocation lacked clear methodological basis.

Allocation involved political bargaining rather than systematic methodology.

Abstract

Primary law of the European Union demands that the allocation of the seats of the European Parliament between the Member States must obey the principle of degressive proportionality. The principle embodies the political aim that the more populous states agree to be underrepresented in order to allow the less populous states to be better represented. This paper reviews four allocation methods achieving this goal: the Cambridge Compromise, the Power Compromise, the Modified Cambridge Compromise, and the 0.5-DPL Method. After a year of committee deliberations, Parliament decreed on 7 February 2018 an allocation of seats for the 2019 elections that realizes degressive proportionality, but otherwise lacks methodological grounding. The allocation emerged from haggling and bargaining behind closed doors.