ODINI : Escaping Sensitive Data from Faraday-Caged, Air-Gapped Computers via Magnetic Fields
Mordechai Guri, Boris Zadov, Andrey Daidakulov, Yuval Elovici

TL;DR
This paper demonstrates how malware can bypass Faraday cages and air-gaps by exploiting low frequency magnetic fields generated by CPU load, enabling data exfiltration from highly secure, isolated computers.
Contribution
It introduces ODINI, a novel malware that controls CPU load to modulate magnetic emissions for covert data transmission through metal shielding.
Findings
Magnetic fields can penetrate Faraday cages and air-gaps.
Malware can control magnetic emissions without special privileges.
Data can be transmitted from virtual machines using magnetic signals.
Abstract
Air-gapped computers are computers which are kept isolated from the Internet, because they store and process sensitive information. When highly sensitive data is involved, an air-gapped computer might also be kept secluded in a Faraday cage. The Faraday cage prevents the leakage of electromagnetic signals emanating from various computer parts, which may be picked up by an eavesdropping adversary remotely. The air-gap separation, coupled with the Faraday shield, provides a high level of isolation, preventing the potential leakage of sensitive data from the system. In this paper, we show how attackers can bypass Faraday cages and air-gaps in order to leak data from highly secure computers. Our method is based on an exploitation of the magnetic field generated by the computer CPU. Unlike electromagnetic radiation (EMR), low frequency magnetic radiation propagates though the air,…
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