Real-Time Rejection and Mitigation of Time Synchronization Attacks on the Global Positioning System

TL;DR

This paper presents TSARM, a real-time method to detect, estimate, and mitigate GPS time synchronization attacks by correcting clock bias and drift, improving robustness and accuracy in GPS receivers.

Contribution

The paper introduces TSARM, a novel real-time technique that estimates attack parameters and corrects receiver clock bias and drift, outperforming existing methods.

Findings

TSARM effectively detects and mitigates GPS time attacks.

The method achieves high accuracy in time recovery.

TSARM outperforms existing approaches in numerical evaluations.

Abstract

This paper introduces the Time Synchronization Attack Rejection and Mitigation (TSARM) technique for Time Synchronization Attacks (TSAs) over the Global Positioning System (GPS). The technique estimates the clock bias and drift of the GPS receiver along with the possible attack contrary to previous approaches. Having estimated the time instants of the attack, the clock bias and drift of the receiver are corrected. The proposed technique is computationally efficient and can be easily implemented in real time, in a fashion complementary to standard algorithms for position, velocity, and time estimation in off-the-shelf receivers. The performance of this technique is evaluated on a set of collected data from a real GPS receiver. Our method renders excellent time recovery consistent with the application requirements. The numerical results demonstrate that the TSARM technique outperforms competing approaches in the literature.