Generalized Dynamics in Social Networks With Antagonistic Interactions
Shidong Zhai, Wei Xing Zheng

TL;DR
This paper presents a comprehensive nonlinear model of opinion dynamics in social networks with both antagonistic interactions and state-dependent susceptibility, analyzing convergence and opinion levels through advanced matrix theory.
Contribution
It introduces a generalized nonlinear opinion dynamics model considering various susceptibility scenarios and provides theoretical conditions for convergence in signed social networks.
Findings
States converge into a subspace defined by the positive eigenvector
Different opinion levels can be characterized by eigenvector entries
Theoretical results are validated through illustrative examples
Abstract
In this paper, we investigate a general nonlinear model of opinion dynamics in which both state-dependent susceptibility to persuasion and antagonistic interactions are considered. According to the existing literature and socio-psychological theories, we examine three specializations of state-dependent susceptibility, that is, stubborn positives scenario, stubborn neutrals scenario, and stubborn extremists scenario. Interactions among agents form a signed graph, in which positive and negative edges represent friendly and antagonistic interactions, respectively. Based on Perron-Frobenius property of eventually positive matrices and LaSalle invariance principle, we conduct a comprehensive theoretical analysis of the generalized nonlinear opinion dynamics. We obtain some sufficient conditions such that the states of all agents converge into the subspace spanned by the right positive…
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Taxonomy
TopicsOpinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Complex Network Analysis Techniques · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
