At What Frequency Should the Kelly Bettor Bet?

TL;DR

This paper investigates the optimal betting frequency under Kelly's criterion, analyzing how performance varies with update intervals, especially in Bernoulli and more general distributions, considering transaction costs and interest effects.

Contribution

It introduces a detailed analysis of betting frequency optimization using Kelly's criterion, including new conjectures and proofs for performance bounds across different update intervals.

Findings

Optimal performance gn* varies with betting interval n.

High-frequency betting (n=1) does not always yield the best results.

Satisfaction of the sufficient attractiveness inequality ensures performance equivalence across betting frequencies.

Abstract

We study the problem of optimizing the betting frequency in a dynamic game setting using Kelly's celebrated expected logarithmic growth criterion as the performance metric. The game is defined by a sequence of bets with independent and identically distributed returns X(k). The bettor selects the fraction of wealth K wagered at k = 0 and waits n steps before updating the bet size. Between updates, the proceeds from the previous bets remain at risk in the spirit of "buy and hold." Within this context, the main questions we consider are as follows: How does the optimal performance, we call it gn*, change with n? Does the high-frequency case, n = 1, always lead to the best performance? What are the effects of accrued interest and transaction costs? First, we provide rather complete answers to these questions for the important special case when X(k) in {-1,1} is a Bernoulli random variable with probability p that X(k) = 1. This serves as an entry point for future research using a binomial lattice model for stock trading. The latter sections focus on more general probability distributions for X(k) and two conjectures. The first conjecture is simple to state: Absent transaction costs, gn* is non-increasing in n. The second conjecture involves the technical condition which we call the sufficient attractiveness inequality. We first prove that satisfaction of this inequality is sufficient to guarantee that the low-frequency bettor using large n can match the performance of the high-frequency bettor using n = 1. Subsequently, we conjecture, and provide supporting evidence that this condition is also necessary.