The Efficiency Gap, Voter Turnout, and the Efficiency Principle
Ellen Veomett

TL;DR
This paper critically examines the efficiency gap metric for detecting partisan gerrymandering, demonstrating its failure to satisfy the efficiency principle especially under unequal voter turnout conditions, and provides a mathematical analysis of this failure.
Contribution
The paper shows that the efficiency gap does not satisfy the efficiency principle and provides a detailed mathematical construction illustrating this failure under various turnout scenarios.
Findings
Efficiency gap can be zero even with large disparities in vote and seat shares.
The efficiency gap fails to detect gerrymandering when voter turnout is unequal.
Mathematical expressions relate turnout ratios to the efficiency gap and election outcomes.
Abstract
Recently, scholars from law and political science have introduced metrics which use only election outcomes (and not district geometry) to assess the presence of partisan gerrymandering. The most high-profile example of such a tool is the efficiency gap. Some scholars have suggested that such tools should be sensitive enough to alert us when two election outcomes have the same percentage of votes going to political party , but one of the two awards party more seats. When a metric is able to distinguish election outcomes in this way, that metric is said to satisfy the efficiency principle. In this article, we show that the efficiency gap fails to satisfy the efficiency principle. We show precisely how the efficiency principle breaks down in the presence of unequal voter turnout. To do this, we first present a construction that, given any rationals and ,…
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Taxonomy
TopicsElectoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Game Theory and Voting Systems
