Attack Potential in Impact and Complexity

TL;DR

This paper introduces a new estimator for assessing the attack potential of vulnerabilities based on impact and complexity, improving prioritization and patching strategies by predicting attack volume more accurately.

Contribution

It presents a novel, computable estimator for vulnerability attack potential that leverages real-world attack data to enhance prioritization over standard patching policies.

Findings

Estimator outperforms standard patching policies in reducing low-risk vulnerabilities.

It maintains high coverage of actual attacks in the wild.

Significantly reduces workload by focusing on high-potential vulnerabilities.

Abstract

Vulnerability exploitation is reportedly one of the main attack vectors against computer systems. Yet, most vulnerabilities remain unexploited by attackers. It is therefore of central importance to identify vulnerabilities that carry a high `potential for attack'. In this paper we rely on Symantec data on real attacks detected in the wild to identify a trade-off in the Impact and Complexity of a vulnerability, in terms of attacks that it generates; exploiting this effect, we devise a readily computable estimator of the vulnerability's Attack Potential that reliably estimates the expected volume of attacks against the vulnerability. We evaluate our estimator performance against standard patching policies by measuring foiled attacks and demanded workload expressed as the number of vulnerabilities entailed to patch. We show that our estimator significantly improves over standard patching policies by ruling out low-risk vulnerabilities, while maintaining invariant levels of coverage against attacks in the wild. Our estimator can be used as a first aid for vulnerability prioritisation to focus assessment efforts on high-potential vulnerabilities.