The modal logic of arithmetic potentialism and the universal algorithm
Joel David Hamkins

TL;DR
This paper explores the modal logic underlying various conceptions of arithmetic potentialism, revealing that propositional validities align with S4, while sentence validities range between S4 and S5, with models fulfilling the maximality principle characterized by a universal algorithm.
Contribution
It provides a detailed modal logic analysis of arithmetic potentialism, connecting different philosophical views to specific modal validities and introducing a simplified account of the universal algorithm.
Findings
Propositional validities in potentialist systems are exactly S4.
Sentence validities range between S4 and S5, with models realizing both.
Models satisfying the maximality principle are characterized by a maximal $\Sigma_1$ theory.
Abstract
I investigate the modal commitments of various conceptions of the philosophy of arithmetic potentialism. Specifically, I shall consider the potentialist conceptions arising from a model-theoretic view of the models of arithmetic as possible arithmetic realms of feasibility, considering them under their natural extension concepts, such as end-extensions, arbitrary extensions, conservative extensions and more, which in effect express distinct potentialist ideas. In these potentialist systems, I show, the propositional modal assertions that are valid with respect to all arithmetic assertions with parameters are exactly the assertions of S4. With respect to sentences, however, the validities of a model lie between S4 and S5, and these bounds are sharp in that there are models realizing both endpoints. For a model of arithmetic to validate S5 is precisely to fulfill the arithmetic maximality…
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