Social Advantage with Mixed Entangled States

TL;DR

This paper demonstrates that mixed entangled states can provide higher payoffs in Bayesian games than classical strategies, utilizing the I-3322 inequality and a restricted social welfare measurement setting.

Contribution

It introduces a novel game framework showing mixed entangled states outperform classical strategies and extends the use of non-Bell inequality states in social advantage scenarios.

Findings

Mixed entangled states yield higher payoffs than classical strategies.

States not useful for Bell-CHSH can be advantageous via I-3322 inequality.

Restricted social welfare strategy enhances social benefits.

Abstract

It has been extensively shown in past literature that Bayesian Game Theory and Quantum Non-locality have strong ties between them. Pure Entangled States have been used, in both common and conflict interest games, to gain advantageous payoffs, both at the individual and social level. In this paper we construct a game for a Mixed Entangled State such that this state gives higher payoffs than classically possible, both at the individual level and the social level. Also, we use the I-3322 inequality so that states that aren't helpful as advice for Bell-CHSH inequality can also be used. Finally, the measurement setting we use is a Restricted Social Welfare Strategy (given this particular state).