On a Stackelberg Subset Sum Game
Ulrich Pferschy, Gaia Nicosia, Andrea Pacifici

TL;DR
This paper studies a two-level Stackelberg game based on the subset sum problem, where a leader manipulates item weights to influence a follower's heuristic solution, analyzing complexity and providing algorithms.
Contribution
It introduces a novel Stackelberg subset sum game model with weight control, analyzing its complexity and proposing exact pseudopolynomial algorithms.
Findings
Optimal weight setting is NP-hard.
Constant-factor approximation is NP-hard.
Exact dynamic programming algorithms are developed.
Abstract
This contribution deals with a two-level discrete decision problem, a so-called Stackelberg strategic game: A Subset Sum setting is addressed with a set of items with given integer weights. One distinguished player, the leader, may alter the weights of the items in a given subset , and a second player, the follower, selects a solution in order to utilize a bounded resource in the best possible way. Finally, the leader receives a payoff from those items of its subset that were included in the overall solution , chosen by the follower. We assume that the follower applies a publicly known, simple, heuristic algorithm to determine its solution set, which avoids having to solve NP-hard problems. Two variants of the problem are considered, depending on whether the leader is able to control (i.e., change) the weights of its items (i) in the objective…
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