Information Theoretic Security for Side-Channel Attacks to the Shannon Cipher System

TL;DR

This paper analyzes side-channel attacks on the Shannon cipher system by modeling them as a signal estimation problem with distributed sensors, deriving new secrecy bounds through information-theoretic methods.

Contribution

It formulates side-channel attacks as a one helper source coding problem and derives novel secrecy bounds using advanced information-theoretic techniques.

Findings

Derived new secrecy bounds for side-channel attacks.

Connected side-channel security to the one helper source coding problem.

Utilized exponential strong converse theorem for security analysis.

Abstract

We study side-channel attacks for the Shannon cipher system. To pose side channel-attacks to the Shannon cipher system, we regard them as a signal estimation via encoded data from two distributed sensors. This can be formulated as the one helper source coding problem posed and investigated by Ahlswede, K\"orner(1975), and Wyner(1975). We further investigate the posed problem to derive new secrecy bounds. Our results are derived by a coupling of the result Watanabe and Oohama(2012) obtained on bounded storage evasdropper with the exponential strong converse theorem Oohama(2015) established for the one helper source coding problem.