How to Beat Science and Influence People: Policy Makers and Propaganda in Epistemic Networks

TL;DR

This paper models the tobacco industry's strategy to influence policy and public opinion through selective research promotion and funding, revealing conditions for its effectiveness even when policymakers are rational.

Contribution

It introduces a formal model of the Tobacco Strategy, analyzing its effectiveness and how media practices can unintentionally reinforce industry influence.

Findings

The Tobacco Strategy can be highly effective under certain conditions.

Rational policymakers can still be misled by strategic information dissemination.

Journalistic practices may inadvertently support industry narratives.

Abstract

In their recent book Merchants of Doubt [New York:Bloomsbury 2010], Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway describe the "tobacco strategy", which was used by the tobacco industry to influence policy makers regarding the health risks of tobacco products. The strategy involved two parts, consisting of (1) promoting and sharing independent research supporting the industry's preferred position and (2) funding additional research, but selectively publishing the results. We introduce a model of the Tobacco Strategy, and use it to argue that both prongs of the strategy can be extremely effective--even when policy makers rationally update on all evidence available to them. As we elaborate, this model helps illustrate the conditions under which the Tobacco Strategy is particularly successful. In addition, we show how journalists engaged in "fair" reporting can inadvertently mimic the effects of industry on public belief.