Range results for some social choice correspondences
Jerry S. Kelly
TL;DR
This paper investigates the range of several social choice correspondences, analyzing how different voting rules and methods behave in terms of their possible outcomes.
Contribution
It provides a comprehensive analysis of the range for multiple social choice correspondences, which was previously not fully characterized.
Findings
Range of plurality voting characterized
Range of Borda rule determined
Range of top cycle correspondence analyzed
Abstract
Determination of the range of a variety of social choice correspondences: Plurality voting, the Borda rule, the Pareto rule, the Copeland correspondence, approval voting, and the top cycle correspondence
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Advanced Causal Inference Techniques · Functional Equations Stability Results