Mechanism Design for Demand Response Programs
Deepan Muthirayan, Dileep Kalathil, Kameshwar Poolla, Pravin Varaiya

TL;DR
This paper introduces a novel self-reported baseline mechanism (SRBM) for demand response programs that incentivizes truthful reporting, ensures load reduction, and minimizes costs by strategically selecting agents based on their reports.
Contribution
The paper proposes SRBM, a mechanism that guarantees truthful reporting and near-optimal cost efficiency in demand response programs.
Findings
SRBM ensures truthful reporting of baselines and marginal utilities.
SRBM guarantees meeting the load reduction target.
SRBM is nearly cost-optimal for the aggregator.
Abstract
Demand Response (DR) programs serve to reduce the consumption of electricity at times when the supply is scarce and expensive. The utility informs the aggregator of an anticipated DR event. The aggregator calls on a subset of its pool of recruited agents to reduce their electricity use. Agents are paid for reducing their energy consumption from contractually established baselines. Baselines are counter-factual consumption estimates of the energy an agent would have consumed if they were not participating in the DR program. Baselines are used to determine payments to agents. This creates an incentive for agents to inflate their baselines. We propose a novel self-reported baseline mechanism (SRBM) where each agent reports its baseline and marginal utility. These reports are strategic and need not be truthful. Based on the reported information, the aggregator selects or calls on agents to…
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