Tracking Cyber Adversaries with Adaptive Indicators of Compromise
Justin E. Doak (JD), Joe B. Ingram, Sam A. Mulder, John H. Naegle,, Jonathan A. Cox, James B. Aimone, Kevin R. Dixon, Conrad D. James, David R., Follett

TL;DR
This paper presents an automated, data-driven framework for tracking and updating indicators of compromise (IOCs) to adapt to evolving cyber adversaries, improving detection over time.
Contribution
The paper introduces a novel self-adapting model for updating IOCs in real-time, addressing the challenge of adversary evolution in cyber threat detection.
Findings
Adaptive model maintains higher true positive rates over time.
False positive rate increases with the adaptive approach but remains manageable.
Overall detection performance is comparable between adaptive and naive methods.
Abstract
A forensics investigation after a breach often uncovers network and host indicators of compromise (IOCs) that can be deployed to sensors to allow early detection of the adversary in the future. Over time, the adversary will change tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), which will also change the data generated. If the IOCs are not kept up-to-date with the adversary's new TTPs, the adversary will no longer be detected once all of the IOCs become invalid. Tracking the Known (TTK) is the problem of keeping IOCs, in this case regular expressions (regexes), up-to-date with a dynamic adversary. Our framework solves the TTK problem in an automated, cyclic fashion to bracket a previously discovered adversary. This tracking is accomplished through a data-driven approach of self-adapting a given model based on its own detection capabilities. In our initial experiments, we found that the…
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