Effects of update rules on networked N-player trust game dynamics
Manuel Chica, Raymond Chiong, Jose Ramasco, Hussein Abbass

TL;DR
This study examines how different update rules influence the dynamics of an N-player trust game on networks, revealing significant effects on trust levels, wealth distribution, and emergent spatial-temporal patterns.
Contribution
It compares various deterministic and stochastic update rules in a networked trust game, highlighting their impact on trust promotion and system dynamics.
Findings
Unconditional imitation rules maximize global wealth in harder games.
Different update rules lead to distinct spatial structures and long-term memory effects.
Stochastic rules induce low-frequency signals and fractal spatial patterns.
Abstract
We investigate the effects of update rules on the dynamics of an evolutionary game-theoretic model - the N-player evolutionary trust game - consisting of three types of players: investors, trustworthy trustees, and untrustworthy trustees. Interactions between players are limited to local neighborhoods determined by predefined spatial or social network topologies. We compare evolutionary update rules based on the payoffs obtained by their neighbors. Specifically, we investigate the dynamics generated when players use a deterministic strategic rule (i.e., unconditional imitation with and without using a noise process induced by a voter model), a stochastic pairwise payoff-based strategy (i.e., proportional imitation), and stochastic local Moran processes. We explore the system dynamics under these update rules based on different social networks and different levels of game difficulty. We…
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