A Non-Cooperative Game Approach to Autonomous Racing
Alexander Liniger, John Lygeros

TL;DR
This paper models autonomous racing as a non-cooperative game, designing three different game formulations to optimize racing strategies, collision avoidance, and blocking behavior, with efficient computation and simulation validation.
Contribution
It introduces three novel game-theoretic formulations for autonomous racing, incorporating collision constraints and strategic behaviors, with methods for real-time implementation and equilibrium analysis.
Findings
Efficient sequential maximization computes equilibria in the first game.
The second game aligns with Stackelberg and Nash equilibria.
Simulation demonstrates successful modeling of racing behaviors.
Abstract
We consider autonomous racing of two cars and present an approach to formulate racing decisions as a non-cooperative non-zero-sum game. We design three different games where the players aim to fulfill static track constraints as well as avoid collision with each other; the latter constraint depends on the combined actions of the two players. The difference between the games are the collision constraints and the payoff. In the first game collision avoidance is only considered by the follower, and each player maximizes their own progress towards the finish line. We show that, thanks to the sequential structure of this game, equilibria can be computed through an efficient sequential maximization approach. Further, we show these actions, if feasible, are also a Stackelberg and Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of our second game where both players consider the collision constraints. The…
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