Models of Weak Theories of Truth
Mateusz {\L}e{\l}yk, Bartosz Wcis{\l}o

TL;DR
This paper compares the strength of various weak truth theories over PA using model-theoretic methods, establishing inclusion relations among classes of models and showing that models of CT− can be expanded to UTB, clarifying interpretability relations.
Contribution
It introduces a model-theoretic framework for comparing weak truth theories and proves that models of CT− can be expanded to models of UTB, answering a key interpretability question.
Findings
Models of PA admit expansions to various truth theories in a hierarchy.
Every model of PA with a CT− expansion can also be expanded to UTB.
UTB is not relatively interpretable in TB, resolving an open question.
Abstract
In the following paper we propose a model-theoretical way of comparing the "strength" of various truth theories which are conservative over PA. Let denote the class of models of PA which admit an expansion to a model of theory Th. We show (combining some well known results and original ideas) that where denotes simply the class of all models of PA and denotes the class of recursively saturated models of PA. Our main original result is that every model of PA which admits an expansion to a model of CT, admits also an expanion to a model of UTB. Moreover, as a corollary to one of the results we conclude that UTB is not relatively interpretable in TB, thus answering the question of Fujimoto.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
