A bilevel approach for optimal contract pricing of independent dispatchable DG units in distribution networks
Ashkan Sadeghi Mobarakeh, Abbas Rajabi-Ghahnavieh, Hossein Haghighat

TL;DR
This paper introduces a bilevel game-theoretic framework for optimal contract pricing among competing dispatchable DG units in distribution networks, balancing DG profit maximization and DisCo cost minimization.
Contribution
It develops a novel multi-leader follower game model formulated as an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) for dispatchable DG units.
Findings
Framework effectively determines fair DG contract prices.
Model successfully applied to IEEE 34-Bus system.
Demonstrates robustness and economic efficiency of the approach.
Abstract
Distributed Generation (DG) units are increasingly installed in the power systems. Distribution Companies (DisCo) can opt to purchase the electricity from DG in an energy purchase contract to supply the customer demand and reduce energy loss. This paper proposes a framework for optimal contract pricing of independent dispatchable DG units considering competition among them. While DG units tend to increase their profit from the energy purchase contract, DisCo minimizes the demand supply cost. Multi-leader follower game theory concept is used to analyze the situation in which competing DG units offer the energy price to DisCo and DisCo determines the DG generation. A bi-level approach is used to formulate the competition in which each DG problem is the upper-level problem and the DisCo problem is considered as the lower-level one. Combining the optimality conditions ofall upper-level…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
